Craig, William Lane. Reasonable Faith. Third ed. Wheaton: Crossway, 2008.


Craig, William Lane and Moreland, J.P. Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview. Second ed. Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 2017.


Adams, Robert Merrihew. “Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil.” In American Philosophical Quarterly 14:2 (1977): 109-117.

Bertolet, Rod (1993) “Hasker on Middle Knowledge,” Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers 10, no. 1 (January 1993): 3–17.

Blotcher, Henri A. G. “Middle Knowledge”: Solution or Seduction?” International Journal of Reformed Theology and Life Unio Cum Christo 4, no. 1 (April 2018).

Bricker, Phillip. “Reducing Possible Worlds to Language.” Philosophical Studies, 52(3) (1987): 331–355.

In this article, Bricker attempts to solve ontological worries associated with possible worlds. In particular, he seeks to solve issues associated with reducing possible worlds to language. This displays an early attempt to ground modal logic without adopting David Lewis’ modal realism. Importantly, Bricker still shows how the cardinality argument derails reductionist accounts of possible worlds on conceptualist or nominalist proposals. This will prove helpful for my central task of approaching CCF’s from an Aristotelian or Powerist perspective. And this will further elucidate the difficulties of reduction and grounding. Moreover, attempts to ground possibility in language are pervasive in the hypotheticalist tradition and often prove problematic. Any survey of modal logic must include this discussion of linguistic entities.

Craig, William Lane.“Middle Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the ‘Grounding Objection’.” Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers 18, no. 3 (2001): 337-352.

Davidson, Jack D., “Leibniz on Providence, Foreknowledge and Freedom.” PhD diss., University of Massachusetts Amherst, 1994.

Jacobs, Jonathan D. “A powers theory of modality: or, how I learned to stop worrying and reject possible worlds.” Philosophical Studies 151, 227–248 (2010).

Jacobs, seeking to defend Powerism, wholly rejects the concepts of abstract or concrete possible worlds. In this paper, he presents reasonable arguments for rejecting modality grounded in possible worlds. His work is especially helpful, because he believes the possible worlds conception to be untenable in any tradition – including Neo-Humeism, Nominalism, and Hypotheticalism. He offers an alternate picture of properties-based modality from the perspective of Powerism. Moreover, Jacobs reframes the semantics of possibility and necessity regarding counterfactuals without appealing to a possible worlds thesis. This will prove to be a helpful starting point for fleshing out a Powerist perspective on counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. The simplicity of Jacobs’ paper proves foundational for important introductory discussion on the broader subject of Aristotelian powerism and its compatibility with modality. And the Powerist rejection of possible worlds will prove an apt counter-narrative to David Lewis’ concretism and Alvin Plantinga’s abstractism. These three perspectives must all be introduced in order to understand the traditionally proposed incompatibility of powerism with CCF’s. Finally, Jacobs overs a persuasive objection to the grounding of modality in possible world – which must be addressed by the Neo-Humeian and Hypotheticalist.

Plantinga, Alvin. “Actualism and Possible Worlds.” Theoria 42 (1976): 139–60; reprinted in Loux (1979): 253–73.

This article from Plantinga is significant in addressing the idea of possible worlds early in the metaphysical discussion. It lays out basic metaphysical shortcomings and limitations of a concretist conception of possible worlds. This is significant for fleshing out various perspectives on the grounding of possibility, modal logic, and CCF’s. Further, Plantinga explicates how an abstractist understanding of possible worlds can elucidate de dicto and de re logical possibility. Plantinga’s work here continues the base level of his argument for hypotheticalism and expounds upon aspects of the nature of counterfactuals.

———. “Two Concepts of Modality: Realism and Modal Reductionism.” Edited by J. Tomberlin. Philosophical Perspectives 1 (1987): 189–231.

In this article, Plantinga addresses modal realism and modal reductionism. He specifically disputes the claim that David Lewis is a modal realist about possible worlds. In doing so, he directly works through Lewis’ theory of concretism, showing how it can’t truly hold up as such. This is an important step in understanding why the Neo-Humeian realist conception of possible worlds cannot logically stand. Moreover, it points to sufficient reasons for rejecting the the grounding of CCF’s in “concrete” possible worlds.

———. “Reply to Robert Adams.” In Alvin Plantinga. Edited by James E. Tomberlin and Peter Van Inwagen. Profiles 5. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985.

Pollock John L. “Plantinga on Possible Worlds.” Edited by J.E. Tomberlin and Peter van Inwagen. Alvin Plantinga. Profiles (An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians), vol 5 (1985). Berlin: Springer, Dordrecht.

Pollock elucidates the possible world theses of Plantinga – while also addressing those of Kripke and Lewis. He specifically seeks to answer questions left by Plantinga’s perception of possible worlds as outlined in The Nature of Necessity. This work proves helpful in elucidating the concepts of Plantinga’s modal logic and perception of CCF’s, as an uncritical outsider. And it further clarifies the densely worded language of Plantinga in his various works. Pollock also comes from a different philosophical ilk than Plantinga, making his contribution especially helpful.

Pruss, Alexander. “The Cardinality Objection to David Lewis’s Modal Realism.” Philosophical Studies, 104 (2001): 169–178.

The cardinality objection is an important rejoinder to Lewis’ extreme modal realism. Pruss is a significant figure in this study of possible worlds, since he posits a combined account of Aristotelian modality with that of Leibniz.

———. “The Actual and the Possible.” In The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics. Edited by Richard M. Gale. Blackwell Philosophy Guides v. 8. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002, 315-333.

van Inwagen, Peter. “Two Concepts of Possible Worlds.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy XI (1986). Edited by P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 185–213.

Van Inwagen is another prominent philosopher in the same tradition as Plantinga. In this important article, Van Inwagen differentiates between the prominent concepts of possible worlds utilizing the labels of “Concretist” and “Abstractionist.” These titles would prove pervasive in later literature. And Van Inwagen does an excellent job listing out the pros and cons of each view. In addition, he offers the concept of set membership – which he uses as a rejoinder to Lewis’ concretism. At the end of this paper, Van Inwagen asserts the supremacy of abstractionism in relation to possible worlds.

Sleigh, Robert “Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge,” Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers 11, no. 4 (1994): Article 2.


MacGregor, Kirk R. Luis de Molina: The Life and Theology of the Founder of Middle Knowledge. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2018.

Currently the only biography of Luis de Molina available in print. MacGregor is a classical Molinist with an expertise in Latin translation. He presents a chronological overview of Molina’s life and death, while delving into the basics of his theology.


Kaufmann, Matthias and Alexander Aichele, eds. A Companion to Luis de Molina. Boston: Brill, 2014.

An overview of Molina’s philosophical thought, unmarred by subsequent developments in the Molinism/MK tradition.

Lewis, David Kellogg. Counterfactuals. Rev. Ed. New York: Wiley, 2001.

In this book, Lewis attempts to ground modality, and thus counterfactuals, in a concretist conception of possible worlds. This work is inarguably influential, and well-neigh crucial, in any discussion of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. Lewis enters the discussion from the perspective of a neo-Humeian and thus has no affinity for nominalism, hypotheticalism, or powerism. If one adopts his worldview, Lewis’ grounding of counterfactuals is incredibly persuasive. Thus, any philosopher committed to grounding counterfactuals of creaturely freedom from a different perspective must directly address Lewis’ work. And indeed, many philosophers and metaphysicians have grappled with Lewis’ concretist conclusions in various books, articles, journals, dissertations, and so forth.

———. On The Plurality of Worlds. Rev. Ed. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 1986.

Lewis’ significant work is necessary in any discussion of modal logic. In this book, the philosopher defends his view of modal realism wherein one grounds possibility in an infinite plurality of worlds. Lewis’ view gives a sufficient metaphysical account for both modal logic and counterfactual conditionals. Herein he explains modality as quantification and counterfactuals as mere statements about possible worlds. Significantly, he emphasizes the benefits of his view via theoretical unity and economy – perhaps the true motivation behind the speculative view he purports. This, at least, is a point his critics lob against him. But it’s hard to argue against the reductive nature of modal realism. By positing the existence of worlds as brute or primitive, Lewis can avoid the problematic attempts of others to explain modal quantifiers via other modal quantifiers. Lewis also addresses various Erastzian views, including those adopting an essentially abstract understanding of possible worlds.

MacGregor, Kirk R. A Molinist-Anabaptist Systematic Theology. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2007.

A brief synopsis of Kirk MacGregor’s theology, which includes some helpful selections on Molinism.

Molina, Luis de, and Alfred J. Freddoso. On Divine Foreknowledge : Part IV of the Concordia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988.

Alfred Freddoso’s translation of the fourth volume of Luis de Molina’s Latin Concordia. This is Molina’s most significant treatment of what would later come to be known as “Molinism.”

Plantinga, Alvin. God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977.

Plantinga’s highly influential treatment of the Ontological Argument and the Logical Problem of Evil.

———. The Nature of Necessity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974.

Plantinga explicates and defends modality de re and modality de dicto. He also presents an abstractist understanding of possible worlds, while taking a hypotheticalist position on the fundamentality of subjunctive conditionals. And he addresses David Lewis’ extreme modal realism by arguing against the Theory of Worldbound Individuals augmented by Counterpart Theory. Lastly, Plantinga applies his modal logic to the logical problem of evil (via the Free Will Defense) as well as the Ontological Argument for the existence of God.

Suárez, Francisco, and Alfred J. Freddoso. On Efficient Causality: Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18, and 19. Yale Library of Medieval Philosophy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.

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